Table of Contents for Lecture Notes

Instructor: G. J. Mattey, Senior Lecturer

Version 2.31, September 25, 2009

1. Introductory Remarks
   • Terminology
   • Theory of Knowledge Today
   • The Projects of Epistemology
   • The Methodlogical Project
   • The Linguistic Project
   • The Analytic Project
   • The Normative Project
   • The Descriptive Project
   • The Validation Project
   • Conclusion
2. Ancient Philosophy I: Plato and Aristotle
   • Plato
     • Plato's Methodology
     • Plato's Analysis of Knowledge
     • Knowledge as Perception
     • True Opinion
     • True Opinion Plus
     • The Value of Knowledge
     • Recollection Elaborated
     • Dialectic
   • Aristotle
     • Argument
     • Scientific Knowledge
     • Foundationalism
     • Knowledge and Opinion
     • Intuitive Knowledge
3. Ancient Philosophy II: Hellenistic Epistemology
   • Epicurean Epistemology
   • The Stoics
   • The Origin of Knowledge in the Senses
   • Assent
   • The Criterion
   • The "Graspable" Presentation
   • Discrimination
   • The Final Account of Knowledge
   • The Stoics as Externalists
   • Weakening
4. Ancient Philosophy III: Ancient Skepticism
   • Early Skeptical Thinkers
     • Xenophanes
     • Heraclitus
     • Protagoras
     • Democritus
     • Socrates
   • PyrrhonianSkepticism
     • Metrodorus and Anaxarchus
     • The Cyrenaics
     • Pyrrho
     • Timon
     • Aenesidemus
     • The Ten Modes
     • What Does the Judging
     • What is Judged
     • What Judges and Is Judged
     • The Problem of the Criterion
     • The Five Modes
     • The Two Modes
     • The Consistency of Skepticism
   • Academic Skepticism
     • Arcesilaus
     • Carneades
   • The Skeptical Revival
5. Modern Philosophy I
   • The Revolt Against Aristotle
   • Corpuscularianism
   • The New Science
   • The Methodological Project
   • The Analytic Project
   • The Port-Royal Logic
   • Kant
   • Descartes
   • Locke
   • Hume
6. Modern Philosophy II
   • The Normative Project
   • The Epistemically Basic
   • Intuition
   • Perception
   • Common Sense
   • The Epistemically Derivative
   • Deduction
   • Probability
   • Explanation
   • Coherence
   • Faith
   • Externalist Norms
   • Epistemic Norms and Practical Norms
   • Decision Theory
   • Deontology
7. Modern Philosophy III
   • The Descriptive Project
   • The Description of the Mind
   • The Description of Perceptual Knowledge
   • Primary and Secondary Qualities
   • Knowledge of the Existence of Objects
8. Modern Philosophy IV
   • The Validation Project
   • Hyperbolic Doubt
     • The Dream Hypothesis
     • General Deception
     • Clear and Distinct Perception
     • Dispelling Doubt
     • The Cartesian Circle
   • The Problem of the External World
   • Descatrtes
   • Skepticism About the External World
   • The Problem of Induction
   • Denying Skepticism
     • Common-Sense Philosophy
     • Kant
9. Contemporary Epistemology: Introductory Remarks
• Terminology
• Theory of Knowledge Today
• The Projects of Epistemology
• The Methodological Project
• Descriptive versus Normative Approaches
• Particularism versus Methodism
• Analysis versus Use
• The Linguistic Project
• The Analytic Project
• The Epistemic Subject
• The Object of Knowledge
• Representing Knowledge
• Conditions for Knowing
• The Gettier Problem
• The Normative Project
• Fallibilism and Infallibilism
• Epistemic and Ethical Norms
• Fallibilism and Infallibilism
• Epistemic Norms
• Foundationalism
• The Support Relation
• The Descriptive Project
• The Validation Project
• Conclusion
10. Contemporary Epistemology I: Method
    • Contemporary Epistemology
    • The Methodological Project
    • Method in the Linguistic Project
    • Method in the Analytic Project
      • The Problem of the Criterion
      • Particularism
      • Fallibilism
      • Internalism and Externalism
    • Method in the Descriptive Project
      • Armchair Epistemology
      • Special Methodological Issues in the Descriptive Project
    • Method in the Validation Project
      • Validating Epistemic Norms
      • Avoiding Skepticism
    • Conclusion
11. Contemporary Epistemology II: Language
• Syntax, Semantics and Pragmatics
• Variability in Knowledge Attributions
• Why We Make Knowledge Attributions
• Risk in Knowledge Attribution
• Culpability in Knowledge Attributions
• Invariantism
• Contextualism
• Relevant Alternatives
• Cohen's Indexical Contextualism
• How the Standard for Knowledge Changes
• DeRose's Sensitivity Condition
• Lewis's Contextualism
• An Objection to Indexical Contextualism
• Non-Indexical Contextualism
• Assessment Contextualism
• Eliminativism
12. Contemporary Epistemology III: Analysis
    • The Analytic Project
    • Knowledge and Truth
    • Knowledge and Belief
      • Belief and Acceptance
      • Knowledge as a Mental State
    • Other Conditions on Knowledge
    • Knowledge and Warrant
      • Internalism and Externalism
      • Externalist Accounts of Warrant
        • The Subjunctive Account
        • The Causal Account
        • The Reliabilist Account
        • The Virtue Account
        • Defeaters
      • Internalist Accounts of Warrant
        • Evidence
        • Support
        • Foundationalism
        • Coherentism
        • Adequacy
        • Foundherentism
        • Non-Doxastic Accounts of Warrant
    • The Gettier Problem
      • Externalist Solutions
      • Internalist Solutions
    • Available Evidence
    • Prospects for Analyses of Knowledge
13. Contemporary Epistemology IV: Epistemic Norms
    • Norms in Contemporary Epistemology
    • Norms for Foundational Beliefs
      • Self-Referential Beliefs
      • Direct Access
      • Constitutive Awareness
    • Norms for Non-Foundational Beliefs
    • Deductive Validity
    • Probability
      • The Calculus of Probability
      • Interpretations of the Calculus of Probability
        • Probability as Degree of Confirmation
        • Probability as Degree of Commitment
        • The Lottery Paradox
        • Probability as Relative Frequency
      • Abduction
      • Coherence
      • Conclusion
    • Contemporary Epistemology V: How We Know
      • A Priori Knowledge
        • BonJour's Account of A Priori Knowledge
      • Naturalized Epistemology
        • The Internal Mechanisms of the Mind
        • Mind as a Part of Nature
      • Science
    • Contemporary Epistemology VI: External-World Skepticism
      • Why Skepticism is Ignored
      • Defense of Particularism
      • The "Moorean Argument"
      • Closure
      • Contextualism
      • Externalism and Skepticism
      • Attacking Skepticism
        • BonJour's Inference to the Best Explanation
        • Lehrer's Argument from Coherence
      • Conclusion

[ Assignment Page | Course Web Page ]

[ G. J. Mattey's Home Page | UC Davis Philosophy Department Home Page | UC Davis Home Page ]

This page and all subordinate pages copyright © G. J. Mattey, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009. All rights reserved.